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FoREwoRD
Felix B. Chang*
In December 2015, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his
wife, Priscilla Chan, publicly pledged to give ninety-nine percent of
their Facebook shares, then worth over $45 billion, to charitable
purposes. 1 As the receptacle for their philanthropy, the couple
created a limited liability company.2 This touched off a flurry of
commentary over the merits of limited liability companies (LLCs)
versus nonprofit organizations and for-profit social enterprises such
as benefit corporations. 3 Anticipating the debates to follow, the
Corporate Law Center at the University of Cincinnati College of Law
(UC) held its 29th Annual Symposium (the Symposium) on corporate
social responsibility and the modem enterprise. 4
The Symposium engaged with the debate over how new forms of
enterprise organizations serve social purposes,5 as well as the
discourse on sourcing dilemmas and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in our globalized world. Several lines of scholarly work
converge
here-the
pushback against
shareholder wealth
maximization, 6
the
theories
governing
choice-of-entity

* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I thank Sean Mangan and Lori
Strait for their hard work in organizing the Symposium. Thanks, too, to all the Symposium participants,
the editors of the University of CincinnatiLaw Review, and the fellows of the Corporate Law Center.
1. Vindu Goel & Nick Wingfield, Mark Zuckerberg Vows to Donate 99% of His Facebook
Sharesfor Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/markzuckerberg-facebook-charity.html? r-0.
2. See Division of Corporations General Information Name Search, DEL. DEP'T ST.,

https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/Ecorp/EntitySearch/NameSearch.aspx (search under the entity name of
"Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, LLC").
3. See, e.g., Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Mark Zuckerberg 's Philanthropy Uses L.L.C. for
More
Control,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
2,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/technology/zuckerbergs-philanthropy-uses-llc-for-morecontrol.html; Celia Taylor, The Chan/Zuckerberg Initiative: Why Not a Benefit Corporation? Because
We

Don't

Need

Them

To

Do

Good,

THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG

(Dec.

11,

2015),

http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-chanzuckerberg-initiative-why-not-a-benefitcorporation.html.
4. For the full agenda, see The 29th Annual CorporateLaw Center Symposium, U. CINCINNATI

C.L. (Mar. 18, 2015), http://law.uc.edulcorporate-law-center/2016-symposium.
5. I use "social purpose" as shorthand for benefits to society, the environment, and the general
public.
6. This includes, for instance, the team production theory, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999), corporate constituency
statutes, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFramework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 Tax. L. REV. 579 (1992), and the communitarian vision of corporate law, see
David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians,and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.

REv. 1373 (1993).
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considerations, 7 and the view of companies as social partners with
citizens.' The contributions to this Symposium issue of the
Cincinnati Law Review reflect this diversity. They range from
analyses of model laws at the forefront of social enterprises, to a new
unifying theory of the corporation and its implications for socially
responsible behavior, to sourcing considerations in the manufacturing
behemoth of China.
The articles by Professor Loewenstein and Professor Murray
examine recent developments in benefit corporation and benefit LLC
law. I read as a common thread in their articles the critique that if a
legislative initiative is too closely associated with one constituent, the
endeavor can be derailed. In both Benefit Corporation Law by
Professor Loewenstein 9 and Beneficial Benefit LLCs? by Professor
Murray,10 B Lab Company (B Lab) plays a central role in driving
model legislation. B Lab, which certifies for-profit companies as "B
corps,"" enjoys something of a first-mover status in the social
enterprise certification market, with spillover effects elsewhere. B
Lab support can spell either the success of social enterprise
legislation1 2 or its failure.13 B Lab appears to guard its primacy
vigorously, which creates an indelible association of benefit
corporations with certified B corps. To that effect, Professor
Loewenstein notes that B Lab opposed the work of a Colorado Bar
Association committee on benefit corporation legislation. 14 Such
input might have cured ambiguities in the Model Benefit Corporation
"

Legislation.

7. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 4-9 (2010).

8. This is more commonly known as corporate social responsibility. For a primer on CSR, as
well as how it overlaps with business and human rights, see Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Social
Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and
Accountability, 14 J. HuM. RTs. 237 (2015).
9. 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381 (2017).
10. 85 U. CIN. L. REv. 437 (2017) [hereinafter Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?]
11. On B corps, which is not the same as benefit corporations, see What are B Corps?, B
CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps (last visited Apr. 14, 2017). On B Lab,
see About B Lab, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab (last
visited Apr. 14, 2017).
12. E.g., the widespread adoption of model laws on benefit corporations. See Loewenstein,
supra note 9, at 382; J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 57578 (2016).
13. E.g., the limited adoption of model laws on benefit LLCs and low-profit limited liability
companies. See Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supranote 10, at 444.
14. See Loewenstein, supra note 9, at 382 n.7.
15. Id. at 382. This is not to disparage William Clark, of course, who drafted the legislation and
who participated in the Symposium. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit CorporationStatutes, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 1, 23 n.101 (2012) [hereinafter
Murray, Choose Your Own Master]; The 29th Annual CorporateLaw Center Symposium, supra note 4.
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Among the worthy points raised in Professor Loewenstein and
Professor Murray's articles, I will linger on the influence that a
powerful constituent can have upon the law reform process. In my
own forays into law reform, 16 I have seen the following scenario
unfold: A committee of lawyers, having labored through all the
nuances and contingencies, assembles a draft bill for the legislature
to consider, only to be preempted by a well-funded interest group
lobbying for its version-which lawmakers promptly adopt instead.
Whether or not Professors Loewenstein and Murray agree, I see
protectionist behavior by such an interest group as commandeering
the more thoughtful and deliberative process of law reform by
collaboration (i.e., by committee).
We are therefore at an interesting juncture. Well-drafted social
enterprise legislation that receives broad acceptance could render the
debate over shareholder primacy moot. Businesses would migrate to
these enterprise forms because of the strong signal of social
commitment that they send to consumers and investors. In fact,
Professor Murray observes that more social entrepreneurs are
foregoing the flexibility and tax advantages of the LLC and opting
for benefit corporations precisely because of the form's signaling
function." Of course, business interests have a way of co-opting
altruism, and social enterprises can become laundromats for greenwashing the pursuit of profits." Over time, then, the authenticity of
their signaling will depend on the accountability mechanisms built
into both model laws and third-party certification processes.
More fundamentally, the success of new forms of social
enterprises might be determined not by the flexibility that those
forms accord' 9 but by whether corporations are conceived in a way
that enables socially beneficial activity. In The Origins of Corporate
Social Responsibility,2 0 Professor Chaffee extends his wholly original
theory of the corporation, the collaborationtheory, which "views the
corporation as a collaborative effort among a state government and
those individuals organizing, operating, and owning the business

These ambiguities could be the result of other forces, such as the inability of the law-reform process to
play out.
16. At UC, I teach trusts and estates, and following the missive of a beloved teacher in this field,
I have participated in several law-reform initiatives through the Estate Planning Section of the Ohio
State Bar Association. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why IDo Law Reform, 45 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM
727 (2012).
17. Murray, Beneficial Benefit LLCs?, supranote 10, at 447-48.
18. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easierfor Directorsto "Do the Right Thing"?, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REv. 235, 249-50 (2014); Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 15, at 33-34.
19. For this and other choice-of-entity considerations, see RIBSTEIN, supra note 7.
20. 85 U. CIN. L. REv. 353 (2017) [hereinafter Chaffee, Origins of CSR].
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entity." 21 Professor Chaffee offers the collaboration theory as a
superior alternative to the three prevailing essentialist theories of
corporations because it more fully explains the metaphysics of
corporations, as well as why government should wield the power to
regulate them distinctively. 22 The article's greatest contributionwhich, in my view, also marks the theory's most significant
development since its first articulation 2 3-is
how collaboration
theory applies to CSR. As an illustration, Professor Chaffee creates a
decision tree comprised of four scenarios: where a corporation
considers whether to engage in socially responsible activity whose
impact to the company is (1) financially beneficial, (2) financially
harmful, (3) financially neutral, and (4) financially uncertain.24 In
doing so, he infuses managerial decisions, which might otherwise
rest upon intuition, with more analytical rigor.
As with other theories, the durability of collaboration theory will
be measured by how it overcomes challenges to its premises. In our
era of widening income inequality, will management and labor be
able to maintain focus on their "common effort"? 25 Professor
Chaffee acknowledges that the interests of corporations and
governments sometimes diverge, though there is still nexus between
them. Surely the same divergence holds for intra-firm constituencies,
who are more likely to become unglued. I look forward to Professor
Chaffee's work as he tinkers with this theory further.
Beyond intra-firm income inequality, another type of inequality
lies at the heart of CSR: inequality among countries.2 6
For
multinational companies, inequality among countries drives sourcing
decisions.
In Beyond Wrecking Chinese Drywall, Professor Hu
traces how low-cost labor and cheap raw materials propelled China to
become the world's most formidable supplier, as well as how the
Chinese government created additional incentives through tax
treaties.2 7 Equally important, Professor Hu also examines how recent
anticorruption campaigns in China have attempted to counteract the
abuses that disparity breeds.2 8
Efforts such as China's anticorruption campaigns can complement
21. Id at 371.
22. See id. at 370-74.
23. See Eric C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A Theory of the Charitable Tax-Exempt
Nonprofit Corporation,49 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1719 (2016).
24. Chaffee, Originsof CSR, supra note 20, at 376-78.
25. Id. at 371.
26. See BRANKO MtLANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL
INEQUALITY (2005).

27. 85 U. CIN. L. REv. 395 (2017).
28. Id. at 426-34.
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the CSR initiatives of global businesses. 29 A recurring theme of the
Symposium was how to bring non-corporate stakeholders such as
governments and consumers into the fold. 30 These conversations will
be ongoing; for our part, UC was glad to have played a role in
facilitating them.

29. The test, of course, lies in how China and other governments actually pursue these reforms.
30. For example, Professor Anita Ramasastry presented on the World Economic Forum's
"shared responsibility" paradigm for supply chains. See GLOBAL AGENDA COUNCIL, WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, SHARED RESPONSIBtLITY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR SUPPLY CHAINs (2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF-GACSupply-Chains %20ANew-Paradigm_2015.pdf
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